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In many countries,taxpayers are provided tax reliefs
if they have dependent children and in some coun-
tries tax reductions are granted also for a dependent
spouse.1 These tax reliefs can take the form of tax
credits or tax allowances.Another form of tax reduc-
tion is the joint taxation of family members along
with an income splitting procedure.In countries such
as France, Germany and Portugal, the taxable in-
come of both spouses is summed up and divided by
two. Each half is taxed according to the ordinary tax
schedule, and the tax assessment includes twice the
amount of the tax imposed on each half. Under a
progressive tax system, this income splitting proce-
dure results in a lower tax duty than under individ-
ual taxation if income is divided unequally between
spouses.2
France is often mentioned as an example for a very
generous tax treatment of families with dependent
children, since income is not only split between
spouses but between spouses and their dependent
family members. This unique system is the so called
“family tax splitting” or “quotient familial”.3 In the
political debate, the relatively high fertility rate in
France is often referred to as being the result of the
generous tax relief for families with dependent chil-
dren. Moreover, the high employment rate of moth-
ers with dependent children is also attributed to the
French tax system – along with the high availability
of public child care.
This article gives a detailed description of the French
system of family tax splitting and its development.
Furthermore, we address the question whether
French family tax splitting, together with the French
child benefits, is actually more generous than child
benefits and tax allowances in other countries.
Finally, we present an overview of the empirical lit-
erature on the effect of family tax splitting on work
incentives of secondary earners and on its potential
effects on fertility.
Family tax splitting in France
Family tax splitting (“Quotient familial”) was intro-
duced in France in 1945. The system has been mar-
ginally modified since its introduction but the princi-
ple remains the same: Joint taxation of spouses4 is
extended to include their children. Family tax split-
ing means that the splitting divisor is increased
according to the number of children.This yields a tax
liability “per family splitting factor”, which has to be
multiplied by the total number of factors (the “split-
ting divisor”) in the household to obtain the total tax
liability. Formally, joint taxation with income split-
ting can be described as follows:
where T is the total tax amount due, t(. ) the tax
schedule, yi the income of household member I and
the “splitting divisor” k depends on the number of
family members. For single individuals, k amounts to
1, for a married couple k equals 2, and under family
tax splitting k is increased according to the number
of children. In the current French system, the split-
ting divisor is increased by 0.5 for the first and the
second child, and 1 for the third and every subse-
quent child. Single parents actually living alone are
allowed to add 0.5 on top of the children’s divisor.5
The sum of “factors”, i.e. the splitting divisor,
depending on the composition of the household can
be compared to equivalence scales. Family tax split-
ting could then be seen as a way of taxing “equival-
ized taxable income”.Although it departs very much
from the most common equivalence scales which are
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used to take into account “economies of scale” with-
in the household,the French “factors”can be seen as
a device aimed at compensating the marginal cost of
children. For example, there is empirical evidence
pointing at a higher marginal cost of the third child,
compared to the second (mainly because of thresh-
old effects concerning housing and some equipment
goods, see for instance Ekert-Jaffe 1994).
Beyond such positive justifications for the splitting
divisor as it is used in France,studying the process of
how it actually was shaped clearly reveals that the
main factor was the normative judgement of the leg-
islator throughout the second half of the twentieth
century concerning family policies: A “rich and
eventful history, where left and right alternately
expressed their conception of the role of family and
of the situations which, to their opinion, deserve or
not the favour of the State” (Piketty 2001, 293).
Under a progressive tax system, family tax splitting
implies tax gains (as compared to a situation of indi-
vidual taxation) that depend on the absolute level of
taxable income, the distribution of incomes within
the family and the number of children. However, in
the current French system of family tax splitting, the
tax gains that can be obtained through the children’s
splitting factors are limited. For the first and the sec-
ond child, the tax gain is limited to 2,159 euros per
year, for the third and every subsequent child, the
ceiling is set at twice this amount. The gains related
to the “single parent bonus”half share are limited at
1,577 euros per year.
Both the spitting factors for the children and the ceil-
ings of the tax gains have changed over time. When
the family tax splitting system was introduced in 1945,
the splitting factor was set at 0.5 for each child and
there was no ceiling for the tax gains.In the late 1970s,
a “large family bonus” was introduced, first by in-
creasing the splitting divisor for families with five
children by 0.5 (1979), then for three children (1980).
When the left came to power in 1981, a ceiling was
introduced for the child-related tax gains. When the
right came back to power in 1986, the splitting factor
for all children from the third onward was increased
to 1; later in 1995, a ceiling was imposed on the “sin-
gle parent bonus” splitting factor. With a new left
wing government in 1997, the system was once again
modified, and all ceilings were lowered.6
Like Germany and many other countries, France
also has a set of child benefits (“Allocations famil-
iales”).All households with two children or more are
entitled to receive child benefits.7 A means-tested
benefit can top off these benefits for families with
three or more children (“Complément familial”).
Moreover,there are other benefits in the tax-benefit
system that imply redistribution towards families
with children.It is outside the scope of this presenta-
tion to give a detailed account of these various
devices. Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that
these other transfers are of great importance in the
overall horizontal redistribution.
The sum of tax gains and child benefits as a function
of taxable income is illustrated for different family
types in Figure 1.8 Families with one child and a tax-
able income up to 8,500 euros per year do not profit
from the “Quotient Familial”; nor do they receive
child benefits which are only granted from the second
child onwards. For one-child families with a taxable
income above 8,500 euros,the tax gain from family tax
splitting increases with taxable income until a ceiling
of about 2,000 euros is reached at a taxable income of
some 52,000 euros. For families with two children, the
schedule of the tax gains is shifted upward by the
amount of the child benefit granted for the second
child (about 1,300 euros in 2001) and reaches a ceiling
of slightly above 5,300 euros at about 60,000 euros of
taxable income. For families with three children, two
main differences arise: they benefit from a full “fac-
tor” for the third child, and they are eligible for the
means-tested complementary child benefit (“complé-
ment familial”). The first difference affects high in-
come families: a maximum tax gain of 11,000 euros is
reached for 70,000 euros of yearly taxable income.The
second difference affects low income families: the
complementary family benefit of 1,654 euros in 2001
phases out at 25,000 euros per year and completely
disappears at 30,000 euros a year.
Thus, one of the most distinctive features of the
French system is that the third child is “subsidized”
at twice the amount of the second child.This is in line
with a more natalist-oriented family policy in France
(Fagnani 2005). As a result of the generous family
6This description sums up the main developments of the family tax
splitting since 1945. For a more detailed account, see Piketty (2001).
7 In 2005,the child benefit amounted to 1,405 euros per year for the
second child and 1,800 euros per year for the third and every sub-
sequent child. For children between 11 and 16 years, these benefits
are increased by 395 euros per year, for children above 16 years of
age there is a supplement of 703 euros per year.
8 The tax gains presented here are those originating from the 2001
French legislation. This is for the sake of coherence, since the
empirical evidence we present rely on data from 2001. There are
only minor differences (in the levels of the ceilings) compared to
the legislation of 2005.tax splitting and the child benefits,more than 70 per-
cent of families with three children do not pay any
taxes in France. In the group of families with two
children,this is only true for 10 percent (Wrohlich et
al. 2005).
Is the French family tax splitting system really that
generous compared to other countries?
Given its unique family tax splitting system, France
is often mentioned for its generous tax treatment of
families with dependent children. Comparisons with
other countries, however, show that the system is
indeed not that different from a child tax allowance.
This is due to the fact that the tax gain per child
resulting from family tax splitting is limited, as out-
lined above. In Germany for instance, which has a
roughly similar income tax
schedule and a child allowance
(“Kinderfreibetrag”) for high in-
comes, the tax gain for the sec-
ond child is roughly similar to
the one observed in France for
very high incomes. However,
the gain rises more steeply in
France than in Germany, as can
be seen from Figure 2.9 In fact,
French family tax splitting is not
more generous than the Ger-
man system of child benefit and
child allowance10 for a large
range of the income distribu-
tion, at least for families with
one or two children.
Baclet et al. (2005) and Wrohlich et al. (2005) have
used micro data in order to compare the empirical
distribution of average tax rates in Germany and
France and have shown that for families with one or
two children in the first five deciles,effective average
tax rates are lower in Germany than in France (see
Figure 3).This is true even though effective average
tax rates for couples without children are higher in
Germany than in France over the whole range of the
income distribution (Baclet et al. 2005). The reason
that effective average tax rates for families with one
or two children in the lower half of the income dis-
tribution are lower in Germany than in France is that
Germany grants a relatively generous child benefit
of 1,848 euros per year from the first child on. For
families with one child,the gains from French family
splitting exceed German child benefits only for a
small range – between a taxable income of 50,000
and 75,000 euros per year.
A rough comparison with other
European countries shows that
the French system is indeed not
more generous than other sys-
tems of cash benefits and tax
allowances. A comparison of to-
tal family support through tax
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Figure 2
9 For a more detailed comparison of the
tax gains implied by the French system
of family tax splitting and German child
allowance, see Wrohlich et al. (2005).
10 In Germany, the child benefit and the
child allowance are not granted simulta-
neously, rather a so-called “higher yield
test” (Günstigerprüfung) is applied: If
the tax relief from the child allowance
exceeds the amount of the child benefit,
the tax allowance is granted, if not the
family receives the child benefit.CESifo DICE Report 4/2006 53
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reliefs and cash subsidies for a family with two chil-
dren and one earner (average production worker)
shows that France ranks at the lower end of the total
support as percent of gross income (OECD 2005b).
While total family support amounts to 11.4 percent
of gross income in Germany, 14.1 percent in the
United Kingdom, 12 percent in Belgium, 10.7 per-
cent in Italy and even 22 percent in Austria, France
only provides 8.5 percent of gross earnings as family
support to this type of family. Lower family support
is granted in Spain (3.2 percent), the Netherlands
(5.4 percent) and most Scandinavian countries. A
rough comparison of this kind cannot,of course,pro-
vide insight into the relative generosity of the French
system in different parts of the income distribution
and for different family types, but at least it shows
that on average – for families with two children – the
French system is not among the most generous ones
in Europe.
Family tax splitting and work incentives
Compared to other European countries, the labour
force participation rate of mothers with young chil-
dren is relatively high in France. The employment
rate of mothers whose youngest child is under six
years of age is 62.2 percent, which is well above the
OECD average of 56.1 percent. Moreover, the share
of part-time working women with a child under six is
below average (26.3 percent versus the OECD aver-
age of 31.5 percent; see OECD 2005b).The relative-
ly high employment rate of mothers, however, is
most certainly not attributable to the French family
tax splitting system but to other factors, in particular
the high availability of public child care.As in all sys-
tems of joint taxation – whether an income splitting
is applied or not or whatever form this income split-
ting may take – both first and secondary earners
have the same marginal tax rate.For the spouse with
lower income (either due to lower hourly wages or
lower working hours or both) this leads to higher
marginal tax rates than individual taxation would
imply,thus creating negative work incentives.A com-
parison of OECD countries shows that France has,
like Germany, Portugal, Poland and other countries
with joint income tax systems, relatively high effec-
tive tax rates on second earners (OECD 2005b).
Empirical studies that have simulated family tax
splitting for Germany (Beblo et al. 2004 and Steiner
and Wrohlich 2006) have shown that introducing a
family tax splitting system would not lead to an
increase in female labour force participation.On the
other hand, it has been shown for Germany (Steiner
and Wrohlich 2004) that individual taxation would
lead to a large increase in the labour force participa-
tion of married women, induced by the large fall in
marginal tax rates for this group that would result
from such a policy shift.
Family tax splitting and fertility
French family policy is not only successful regarding
the high employment rates of mothers but also with
respect to the fertility rate.With a total fertility rate
of 1.88,France ranges well above the OECD average
of 1.60 and higher than most other European coun-
tries such as Germany (1.34), Italy (1.27) and Spain
(1.26), and even some Scandinavian countries such
as Denmark (1.72) or Sweden (1.65) (OECD 2006).
France’s high fertility rate has also frequently been
attributed to the pro-natalist family policy, in partic-
ular the family tax splitting system. The empirical
evidence on a causal effect of tax incentives on fer-
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Figure 3
11 For an overview of empirical studies on a causal relationship
between policy measures and fertility, see Björklund (2006), Lalive
and Zweimüller (2005) and D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005).is no empirical evidence of the impact of the tax sys-
tem alone on fertility in France. One study by
Laroque and Salanie (2004) that tries to quantify a
causal effect of financial transfers on fertility shows
that the generous reform of the parental leave bene-
fit (Allocation parentale d’éducation,APE) is likely
to have had a positive effect on fertility. Cross-coun-
try studies usually face the problem that single poli-
cy measures such as tax incentives can hardly be dis-
entangled from other policies potentially affecting
fertility that vary across countries. For example,
availability of subsidized child care, parental leave
legislations and availability of part-time employment
opportunities also differ across countries.A compar-
ative panel data study by d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole
(2005) that controls for a set of policy variables
shows that there are positive effects to be expected
from higher parental leave benefits (of short dura-
tion) and from higher cash transfers to families.
However, their simulation results show that fertility
would not change in all countries as a consequence
of higher benefits (for example the authors find very
small effects of an increase in child transfers for
Germany and Spain, countries with relatively low
fertility rates). Overall, it is most likely that the rela-
tively high fertility rate in France cannot be attrib-
uted to the tax treatment of dependent children as
such but – if at all – to a policy mix of high availabil-
ity of child care, generous parental leave benefits
from the second child onwards and tax reliefs and
cash benefits for children.
Summary and conclusion
The unique tax treatment of dependent children in
the so-called “family tax splitting” system as prac-
ticed in France has often influenced policy makers
in other countries to cite France as having a very
generous family policy. As we have shown, the
French system of family tax splitting is,however,not
that different from child allowances, since the tax
gains for the children that can be achieved through
the splitting procedure are limited. The amount of
the tax relief in France is actually not above the
average of OECD countries, at least for families
with one or two children.The decisive feature of the
French policy is the relatively generous support for
the third and every subsequent child. This policy is
not only reflected in family tax splitting but also in
the scheme of child benefits that increase with the
rank order of the child, as well as the parental leave
benefit.
We have furthermore reported evidence that family
tax splitting per se cannot explain the relatively high
employment rate of French mothers, since a joint
income tax system always creates negative work
incentives for secondary earners compared to a sys-
tem of individual taxation. The high employment
rate of mothers in France can thus be attributed to
the high availability of public child care. The ques-
tion whether family tax splitting can act as an expla-
nation for the relatively high fertility rate in France,
has to be left unanswered due to lack of empirical
evidence.There is evidence that family policy can in
fact affect fertility,however,it seems more likely that
the effect stems from a successful policy mix of child
care, parental leave, tax allowances and child bene-
fits rather than from the tax system in itself.
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